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Copyright law has an ambiguous relation with freedom of expression. On one hand, copyright law protects the free expression of creators by ensuring that they collect the benefits of their own work. Without the existence of copyright law, any creator would be threatened by the possibility of others re-appropriating her work and presenting it as their own. Copyright allows artists to express themselves without worrying about the potential reproduction of their words, art or music.​[1]​ On the other hand, as is often noted, copyright law restricts the form that expression might take by forbidding the free use of copyrighted materials. The Internet has allowed an unprecedented increase of possibilities for information sharing and, arguably, a dramatic increase in the enjoyment of freedom of expression by everyone (Ginsburg, Nov. 2001). In this rapidly-changing environment, it is not only the enforcement of copyright that has been put into question but also its moral legitimacy (Davies, 2002, p. 32). The conflict between freedom of expression and copyright raises a number of important normative issues. Not all of them can be dealt with within the scope of this chapter. In particular, I will not address here the important normative issues raised by the direct copyright control that some corporations assert over the use of cultural and intellectual works.​[2]​ 

I will start by giving an outline of the argument of my paper. The diagram attached at the end of this paper should provide further guidance in examining the possible interactions between freedom of expression and copyright (Appendix 1). To begin with, the possibility of a conflict between copyright and freedom of expression requires the prior theoretical recognition of the general possibility of conflict of rights. Some authors, such as Hillel Steiner (1994), do not even recognise the possibility of conflict between rights. Assuming that one accepts the general possibility of conflict of rights, one might still hold that the specific rights of freedom of expression and copyright do not (or can not) conflict with each other (1). Such a claim could be supported if any of the following claims were true. First, the enjoyment of freedom of expression does not require the reproduction of art works (1.1). Second, freedom of expression requires some access to copyrighted materials, but the allowances made in copyright law are sufficient for the protection of free speech (1.2). Third, the reproduction of copyrighted work does not constitute a violation of copyright because copyright is defined in a way that pre-empts conflict. For instance, property rights include either only moral rights or moral rights and a redefined set of economic rights (1.3). 
I will claim that the specific rights of freedom of expression and copyright don’t conflict with each other if any of these claims is true. Moreover, the specific rights of freedom of expression and copyright can’t conflict with each other, if any of these claims is always true. 

I will then turn to examine the possibility that the specific rights of freedom of expression and copyright do conflict (2). Given that neither freedom of expression nor copyright can be plausibly argued to be absolute rights -an absolute right is a right that can’t be overridden/ infringed (Gewirth, 1981), I will need to chart a step-by-step procedure to figure out which right needs to be given up when there is conflict. Assuming that the two rights conflict, I will examine two possible stands on their respective strengths: either both rights have the same status or they don’t. ​[3]​ This will depend on the theory of justice adopted. On a Rawlsian theory of justice, both rights have the same status. 

First, copyright and freedom of expression do not have the same status (2.1): 

	More likely, the solution of the conflict is principled, as the stronger right trumps the other. Moreover, there is no overwhelming interests on one side or the other (2.1.1). 
	One of the rights is clearly stronger but there is an overwhelming balance of harm and benefit in favour of the weaker right such that the weaker right is favoured. This should be an exception, as rights are designed to preempt the consideration of interests, but I do not want to entirely exclude this possibility. (2.1.2)

Second, copyright and freedom of expression might have the same status (2.2). I will claim that this is what would be the case in a Rawlsian theory of justice. In such a case, three alternative decision-making procedures can be employed to try to resolve the conflict:

	The conflict could be resolved arbitrarily (2.2.1). I will argue against this option. 
	The conflict could be resolved by a non-consequentialist appeal to the values connected to the rights (2.2.2). I will provide a template for such a qualitative analysis and describe two similar qualitative methods used by Waldron and Rawls. 
	The conflict is resolved by taking into consideration the balance of harm and benefit (2.2.3). Consequences have to be taken into account only if they are decisive and, after the qualitative methods (see 2.2.2) have been employed. This method has diverse versions depending on the conception of interests endorsed (material interests, non-material interests or a combination of the two). 

First step: is conflict of rights at all possible?

I will start by a brief description of the concepts of freedom of expression and copyright. Copyright is one kind of intellectual property rights. Intellectual property rights include also patents and trademarks. Copyright prevents others from copying or reproducing an author’s work without his/her permission (Hart, Fazzani & Clark, 2006, p. 161). It involves defined types of cultural, informational and entertainment productions and is given to authors, playwrights, composers, artists and film directors (Cornish. & Llewelyn, 2003, p. 8). In order to be copyrighted, the work must be original,​[4]​ recorded and created by a qualifying person (Cornish, 2006, p. 6). I will assume that copyright includes both the economic rights derived from the power attributed to the copyright owner to have control over the reproduction of her work and the moral rights derived simply from ownership of copyrighted work. Copyright is usually justified in two different ways. First, it is justified in terms of the author’s natural right to the economic benefits from his work. Second, copyright is justified on the basis of it being socially beneficial, as it provides incentives for individuals to be creative. 

Freedom of expression protects any kind of expressive act- it does not need to be, strictly speaking, a speech. Freedom of expression consists mostly in a special treatment of the value of expression: ‘When there is a Free Speech Principle, a limitation of speech requires a stronger justification, or establishes a higher threshold, for limitations of speech than for limitations of other forms of conduct. This is so even if the consequences of the speech are as great as the consequences of other forms of conduct.’ (Shauer, 1982, p. 8) Freedom of expression isn’t thus an absolute prohibition to regulate speech. It constitutes rather a presumption against state interference. 

Freedom of expression is usually justified by three different arguments. The first two arguments give instrumental value to freedom of expression while the last one gives it intrinsic value. The first argument is based on the epistemic value of expression. This is the traditional Millian argument claiming that free speech allows for a free market of ideas most conducive to truth. The second argument is based on the function freedom of expression plays in a democratic society. Free speech allows for the expression of diverse political opinions and the good functioning of democracy (Shauer, 1982, pp. 35-47). The last argument for freedom of expression is rooted in its intrinsic value as a fundamental individual right that is constitutive of what it is to respect each individual equally (Dworkin, 1977, p. 273). Freedom of expression is valued because it shows respects for the reasoning powers of each individual. 

I would like to set aside the problem of the general possibility of conflict between rights. There are indeed some views that deny that rights could conflict. On a choice-based theory of rights, ​[5]​ this is necessarily so, because one of the fundamental features of a choice-based system of rights is the compossibility of rights, that is, the mutual consistency of rights within a single system.​[6]​ There is no conflict of rights, because rights should constitute an ordered system in which conflict is precluded. Similarly, on an interest-based theory of rights, ​[7]​ specificationists argue that there is no conflict of rights. On this specific view of the interest-based theory of rights, there might be an appearance of conflict, but it will dissolve once the situation is examined closely enough. If there is appearance of conflict, specifying/ qualifying the rights will be enough to show that they are not conflicting (Wellman, 1995, p. 277 and following).

The rest of this chapter will be based on the plausible assumption that conflicts between rights are possible. This view is compatible, however, with holding that there is no conflict between the specific rights of copyright and freedom of expression. I’ll therefore first consider three arguments to this effect.

1. The specific rights of free speech and copyright don’t conflict

Freedom of expression aims at protecting the individual right to expression from illegitimate restriction. One must thus ask whether copyright law restricts freedom of expression and, if it does, whether it does so legitimately. Two accommodations have already been made by copyright law for the purpose of upholding individuals’ freedom of expression. First, copyright law distinguishes between the content of the work and the form in which it is expressed.​[8]​ It thus allows for the diffusion of the ideas that constitute the content of the work, while preventing the exact reproduction of the expression in which they have been originally conveyed (Weinreb, 1998, p. 1152-1153). Second, copyright law allows for what has been called `the fair use´ of copyrighted work, which is the reproduction of small samples of copyrighted work. Copyright law will therefore conflict with freedom of expression if and only if the following claims are true:

a)	The reproduction of copyrighted work is necessary for the enjoyment of freedom of expression.

b)	This reproduction constitutes a violation of copyright. This constitutes a condition on the conception of copyright employed in a): it must be such that there is an actual conflict (and not only a prima facie conflict) between copyright and freedom of expression. 

c)	The allowances made by copyright law are not sufficient for the protection of freedom of expression. 
	
With respect to the claim (a), there is already an existing literature that points to some particular cases in which the reproduction of intellectual/cultural work is necessary for the enjoyment of freedom of expression (See Griffiths and Suthersanen, 2005). The familiar examples that suggest a tension between the two rights are instances of parodies, satires and criticism. 

I will now examine other instances of (a) that have not been discussed in the literature and then show that some of these instances are not fully covered by the accommodations already made by copyright law (c) and involve a conception a copyright in which the reproduction of a copyrighted work without permission constitutes a violation of copyright (b). 

Finally, one could hold the view that freedom of expression can’t conflict with copyright law. This would be the case if one held that either a), b) or c) would never be the case or, if one held the view that a), b) and c) would never all be true in the same instance. 

1.1: freedom of expression does not require the reproduction of copyrighted work

The first objection that could be raised against the claim that copyright and freedom of expression conflict is to argue that the reproduction of a copyrighted work is unnecessary for free expression. After all, in the case of non-intellectual property rights, such as land property, no one would make the claim that it might be necessary to violate a property right in order to enjoy freedom of expression. Let us take the case of an individual x who wants to oppose another individual y’s point of view. One way of doing this would be for x to trespass y’s property and stand in y’s garden to make a protest there. But it would usually be contended that the trespassing of y’s property is not really necessary as the same expressive aim might be achieved by other means. The same claim could be made in the case of a speech that uses copyrighted material; does the speech really needs the material in question for expressive purposes? Couldn’t the individual use her own words? 

The problem with this kind of question is that it stands against the spirit of freedom of expression, as it entails a judgement on form a speech should take.​[9]​ To start examining whether the form of the speech in question is legitimate is at odds with what the principle of freedom of speech is supposed to establish, that is, the total absence of restraints of speech on the basis of differences in judgement (Alexander, 2005, p. 20).

Let us imagine an individual who, for such expressive purposes, reads out Silvia Plath’s poetry in the street. Our imaginary character, let us call him Ulysses, is performing gratuitously​[10]​ in a public place the poems of another person.​[11]​ If we would ask Ulysses why he uses the poems of Sylvia Plath, he could reply that they express perfectly what he feels. If we push him on that and ask him to express these feelings using different words, we are assuming that what he has to say can be expressed differently and that it is not perfectly expressed by these particular poems. 

There are two arguments for the claim that the reproduction of copyrighted works is sometimes necessary for the enjoyment of freedom of expression. The first argument is related to the last point made about the specific expressive force of some copyrighted work: copyright is not any kind of property right, it is the property right given to the authors, composers and creators of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works [I will refer to the authors, composers and creators as creators for short. I will refer to literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works as copyrighted work for short]. Creators fulfil a special function in society. They are talented at expressing some ideas and feelings via their art. The creator is able to convey something that other individuals’ experience but are not able to convey as skilfully. Individuals may thus feel that performing or reproducing an existing text, a song or an art piece is the best way of conveying their own feelings or ideas. Should Ulysses be charged for breach of copyright law?​[12]​ According to current copyright law, he is breaking the law (Phillips and Firth, 2000, p.186).

I have argued so far that one way of arguing that the reproduction of copyrighted work is necessary for the enjoyment of freedom of expression is to invoke the special function creators have to express emotions and ideas in a way that other individuals can relate to/be inspired by or find helpful.  However, another argument is available. Instead of pointing to the special function of creators, one could point to the special function a copyrighted work can have within a cultural group. Some copyrighted works have indeed become cultural symbols and have become part of a common cultural language. They have become so imbedded in the culture of a nation that they convey a whole series of implicit references and connotations.​[13]​ For reasons that will be fully exposed below, these copyrighted works can’t be replaced by other means without incurring a modification of their meaning. These copyrighted works belong to the community to such an extent that withdrawing them from the community would constitute a harm to its members, as they won’t be able to express accurately their feelings or ideas (Gordon, 1990, p.1009).

Both these arguments could thus be used by Ulysses to explain why he can’t express himself without using Plath. Let us thus grant the fact that it might be necessary for Ulysses to use Plath’s copyrighted work to fully enjoy freedom of expression. I believe so far that this could be a plausible case. Now one could still object that copyright law has made specific allowances that might seem sufficient to preserve freedom of expression. I turn now to examine this possibility. 





The question here is whether the allowances of copyright law provided by the fair use principle and the form/content distinction (otherwise known as idea/expression distinction) are enough to pre-empt any conflict between freedom of expression and copyright. According to copyright law, ideas (or content) from a copyrighted work can be reproduced as long as they are conveyed in a different expression (or form). The distinction between form-content is thus crucial in respecting freedom of expression: individuals are allowed to convey ideas, they are just restricted in their use of specific expressions of these ideas. Freedom of expression does not prohibit the regulation of the formal features of expression. It looks like allowing for the reproduction of the ideas of a copyrighted work would be sufficient thus to protect freedom of expression. 

However, let us examine closer the belief that the ability to convey ideas contained in a copyrighted work is sufficient to preserve freedom of expression. Several objections can be formulated against the claim that the ideas present in a copyrighted work can be conveyed without the reproduction of the work in question. I will address here these objections.

i) Such a translation is impossible: 

It is not clear whether it is actually possible to “translate” an intellectual or cultural work into abstract ideas. The form might be closely intertwined with the content of the work. Often the form contributes greatly to determine the content (or meaning) and it might not be possible to identify a single definite set of ideas. As Nelson Goodman notes, it’s hard to deny that 

[E]xpressing is at least as important a function of many works as is saying; and what a work expresses is often a major ingredient of its style. The differences between sardonic, sentimental, savage, and sensual writing are stylistic. Emotions, feelings, and other properties expressed in the saying are part of the way of saying; what is expressed is an aspect of how what is said is said, and as in music and abstract painting may be an aspect of style even when nothing is said. ... for since expression is a function of works of art, ways of expressing as well as ways of saying must be taken into account (Goodman, 1978).

Goodman here rejects the claim that one can actually proceed to isolate style from content in an artwork. Although style is not a synonym for form, since it conveys elements of the content of the artwork in question, the formal properties of an artwork constitute partly the vehicle of its style. If style is necessary for the understanding of the expression in question, then the form itself is necessary for an appropriate interpretation of the ideas expressed in the copyrighted work. Similarly, it has been argued that the style of some philosophers’ writings is crucial to understand their works.​[14]​ 

Conveying the ideas of a specific copyrighted work implies that there is one straightforward interpretation of this copyrighted work. The content of a copyrighted work might be intentionally ambiguous. Cinema critiques have different interpretations of movies. Moreover, some artistic creations can’t be transcribed into abstract ideas because they do not contain a narrative sequence of ideas. Musical pieces are a good example of non-narrative artworks. 

Even if one grants that the ideas can be translated, the expressive value of the copyrighted work might not be preserved. For instance, on the basis of the original footage of the murder of President Kennedy, one could proceed to elaborate a detailed description of the death of President Kennedy. This would constitute a perfect example of an attempt to convey the content of a copyrighted material without reproducing the form of this material. Although the verbal description would convey with accuracy the content of the original footage, the verbal description would not match its emotional force.

I believe this claim is absolutely true with respect to art, the content of artistic expression might not be translatable into another form. I believe however also that this argument fails because the concept of expression used in artistic circles is not the same as the concept of expression at stake in freedom of expression. The concept of expression used in artistic circles assumes subtleties in expression that would be beyond the understanding of the individual who expresses herself. Whereas an artwork can be appreciated without the artist being fully aware of the full meaning of what has to be expressed, speech protected by freedom of expression has to be self-conscious to a certain extent. Let us take Ulysses again. Ulysses would tell us: ‘I want to express myself, but I don’t really know how I feel, I know I feel depressed, but I somehow believe that Sylvia Plath express myself.’ I would find that is a justified argument for a partial reproduction of Sylvia Plath poetry. But I would certainly not argue that it justifies a reproduction beyond fair use (see below). The agent has to express himself, and the use of copyrighted work has to be instrumental for that purpose. 

ii) Such a translation might be inaccurate: 

Second, apart from any doubt about the mere possibility of such a “translation”, the fact that this “translation” is made by someone who is not the artist herself might distort further the original meaning of the copyrighted work. Having to do without the original artwork entails that one trusts the author of the “translation” of the copyrighted work into abstract ideas. I mentioned earlier that there were problems in assuming that one could have a single interpretation of one work. I am here questioning the accuracy of letting the translation be made by individuals other than the artist herself. Let us take again Ulysses as an example. If we ask him to paraphrase Sylvia Plath in order to express himself, his re-creation of Sylvia Plath’s poetry might cause a great misunderstanding of her original work.  

This argument fails again because it seems to overlook the fact that if the reproduction is made, it is for the purpose of the individual free expression. There might well be an inaccuracy in the translation of the work in question, but the free interpretation of copyrighted work is a definitive part of freedom of expression. 


iii) The translation is inefficient/too costly: 

The process of translation is time and resources consuming. Time and resources would be necessary for the translation and this extra cost could be the equivalent of the copyright fee. If one wants to argue that there is a conflict between freedom of expression and copyright, one must adopt a conception of freedom in which the payment of a certain fee constitutes a restriction of freedom (as I will argue below). The supplementary cost of translating the copyrighted work would thus not be a solution to the problem but just another kind of cost. This translation is an infringement on the freedom of expression of the individual because it imposes a cost too high on individuals in exercising their freedom. 





The principle of fair use, which allows for a restricted reproduction of a copyrighted work, is plagued with similar problems.​[15]​ First, sampling entails a loss of complexity in the process. A theatre play in three acts would most probably lose some of its complexity, if only a section of one of its acts can be reproduced. Second, the sampling of a text is often problematic to the extent that the extraction of the sample from its context might induce a wrong interpretation of the work. The content conveyed by a part of a copyrighted work is only properly conveyed when that part is located within its whole.

This is true, once again, if one is looking at the interpretation of artworks. But the agent is to have some role in the expression for it to be protected speech. The reproduction of the entire work by an artist does not seem to be instrumental to the expression of the agent. The same could have been accomplished by referring to the work. An important exception is to be noted, it pertains to borderline cases, that is, cases in which an individual expresses herself using copyrighted work just beyond the specific allowances. I believe that case could actually ground a conflict of rights. 

I have argued so far that, in addition to the examples of parodies, criticisms and satires referred to in the literature, there could be possible instances, similar to Ulysses’ use of Sylvia Plath, in which the respect for freedom of expression would require violation of copyright laws. I have also indicated how the provision of fair use and the allowance made for the reproduction of content may fail to be an appropriate substitute for the full-scale reproduction of the whole copyrighted work. I have also expressed my belief that, although possible such conflict is unlikely. I have point to what seems to me the most likely case that would trigger conflict: cases in which an individual uses copyrighted work just beyond the allowances made by copyright law. There is another reason for thinking that copyright and freedom of expression do not conflict. I will turn now to this last possibility: the conflict between the two rights is only prima facie. 

1.3 The conflict is only prima facie

Copyright and freedom of expression might be conflicting because one has misinterpreted the demands of copyright or/and freedom of expression. The presence of conflict between two rights will be directly related to the ways the rights involved are defined. I will suggest here one conception of copyright and one conception of freedom of expression that would pre-empt the possibility of conflict between the two rights. Let me start by suggesting one such conception of copyright. 

There are two different approaches that can be adopted towards copyright. The first approach is general and focus on one single question, which is whether or not a creator should have any copyright-related right attached to her work. But this question seems easy enough to answer. It would indeed be hard to deny that a creator is entitled to some rights with respect to her own creation. The second approach envisages copyright as a bundle of different rights and assesses the justification for each right separately.  On this latter approach, one might legitimately define copyright as a narrower set of rights, which could be entirely compatible with freedom of expression.   
This minimalist conception of copyright will have as a consequence that the reproduction of a copyrighted work does not constitute a violation of copyright. This conception of copyright defines it as being constituted only by moral rights of intellectual property.​[16]​ These rights give moral privileges of identification and integrity to the creator of a work. On most legal conceptions, copyright includes at least two moral rights:
  
	The right to be identified as author or film director
	The right to object to derogatory treatment of a work​[17]​

These moral rights have often been treated as part of copyright law.​[18]​ If copyright is defined as referring only to these moral rights, the reproduction of copyrighted work will not violate copyright as long as these moral rights are respected: If an individual requires the reproduction of a copyrighted work, she can do so, as long as she identifies the artist and does not damage the work in question. These two conditions are relatively undemanding to satisfy. This conception is however not plausible, as it does not include any economic right.​[19]​

Let us turn now to a minimalist conception of freedom of expression, I will refer to it as a ‘libertarian’ conception of liberty. A libertarian conception of liberty would characterise individuals as free as long as they are not prevented by the state from doing what they have a right to do. On this conception of liberty, having to pay a copyright fee is not tantamount to be prevented from doing what one has a right to do. The right to free speech is defined within a system of rights that limit each other. On this conception, one should be free to do only what one has a right to do and as long as one does not infringe upon the right of someone else. On that conception, it does not make sense to claim that intellectual property right and freedom of expression conflict, as freedom of expression is constrained by property rights.​[20]​ 

I labelled this conception of freedom a libertarian conception, because it is most vehemently defended by libertarian liberals. This label is slightly misleading however, as many non-libertarian liberals share the belief that liberties should restrain each other. Rawls distinguishes between regulations and restrictions (Rawls, 2005, p. 295). Regulations are infringements that are justified by the necessity to respect another liberty, whereas restrictions are violations of rights not justified by the presence of another conflicting liberty.​[21]​ According to Rawls thus: ‘the priority of these liberties [the basic liberties] is not infringed when they are merely regulated, as they must be, in order to be combined into one scheme.’ (Rawls, 2001, p. 111) This regulation of the basic liberties performs de facto a similar function than do the requirements of the libertarian conception of freedom described above; namely allowing for the creation of a coherent system of rights and restricting the grounds on the basis of which a right could be curtailed.​[22]​ 

The libertarian conception of freedom can be objected on two counts: first, any law restricts freedom to the extent that it imposes limits on individuals’ behaviour. When libertarians claim that they maximise freedom, they are just giving priority to the liberties they believe to be important. The question of what theory of justice is most freedom-maximising should not be resolved on the basis of a comparison of the number of laws entrenched but on the basis of how much freedom these laws promote in the general population.​[23]​ Second, the libertarian account becomes circular if one is free to do only what one has a right to do, when this right is justified on the basis of what one should be free to do (see Cohen, 2001, p.60-61).

Let me briefly sum up what has been said so far. I have claimed that there were three conditions necessary for freedom of expression to conflict with copyright.​[24]​ I have shown that a conflict between these two rights was conceivable, but I would like to underline the fact that I have also claimed the implausibility of such a conflict. I suspect indeed that the occurrence of such a conflict would be highly unlikely, given that the three conditions mentioned need to be met in a single instance. In particular, I have argued that it would be hard to establish that the reproduction of a copyrighted work beyond what is allowed by the copyright allowances would be needed for the enjoyment of freedom of expression. Moreover, the arguments mentioned in 1.2 are not convincing to my mind, because they use a concept of expression that is useful for artistic interpretation but might not be relevant for freedom of expression. I believe that free speech as a political right might not demand that level of subtle nuances. I pointed to one situation in which the arguments mentioned above could be satisfying: these would cases that are presently legally borderline: cases in which someone uses a few lines than what is warranted by fair use.  I will thus proceed to examine what could be done in such case. 

2. The specific rights of copyright and freedom of expression conflict

If the three conditions are present in a singular instance, a conflict between copyright and freedom of expression has been identified and the next step consists in trying to resolve this conflict. I will suggest that the first question to be asked is thus whether the two rights have the same ranking. In order to find out what ranking each right has, one has to situate the debate within a specific theory of justice. Different theories of justice will give indeed different weight to values and the rights that protect these values.​[25]​

To begin with, I would like to make a few notes on theories of justice and rights. Not all theories of justice recognise individual rights, although all at least have some ranking of values. A fully act-utilitarian conception of justice does not necessarily attribute any weight to individual rights. Some religious conceptions of justice might not even recognise either freedom of expression or property rights as individual rights. 

In this paper, I will examine the conflict between copyright and freedom of expression from the perspective of a liberal theory of justice.​[26]​ There is nevertheless a considerable variation across different liberal theories of justice. Although all liberal theories of justice give protection to individual rights, they differ with each other in their ranking of rights. This ranking, far from being arbitrary, is underpinned by a prior judgment of the relative importance of the human interests protected by these rights. The ranking of rights reflects thus on the conception a theory of justice has of what are the most important individuals interests that need protection. There are thus two possible stands on the conflict between copyright and freedom of expression. 

On one hand, the two rights might not have the same status (2.1). Let me just note that, in such a case, there are two different situations. First, the right thing to do might be to give priority to the stronger right. This is a principled way of resolving the conflict and it is also the most likely situation (2.1.1). In this kind of case, the resolution of the conflict is relatively easy.​[27]​ Let us take the example of the conflict between the right to life (or more precisely in this case to health care) and the right to private property. Let us suppose that a child fell from the top of a tree to the neighbouring house property and hurt himself badly. The child’s right to healthcare takes priority in this case over the respect owed to the owner’s property. When the emergency services arrive to take the child, they will not wait to be able to get the owner’s agreement for them to enter his property. The right of the child takes priority over the right of the owner. Second, even when the rights hold different ranks, it can still be the case that the right thing to do is to favour the weaker right. This would occur only if there is a decisive balance of harm and benefit that would support the infringement of the stronger right (2.1.2).​[28]​ 

On the other hand, both rights might have equal status (2.2). For instance, John Rawls’s theory of justice [henceforth Justice-as-Fairness] would grant an equal status to the rights of freedom of expression and copyright. Rawls considers indeed both property rights and freedom of expression as basic liberties.​[29]​ In Justice as Fairness, basic liberties can be limited only when they clash with each other: ‘The priority of liberty implies in practice that a basic liberty can be limited or denied solely for the sake of one or more other basic liberties, and never, as I have said, for reasons of public good or of perfectionist values.’  (Rawls, 2005, p. 295)

In this kind of case, we’ll have to turn to different strategies to resolve the conflict. I will suggest that the conflict could be resolved in three alternative ways. First, it could be resolved arbitrarily, given that there is no principled way of choosing to favour one right over the other. If both rights are given the same ranking within a theory of justice, one option is to simply arbitrarily favour one of the two (2.2.1). My first objection to this option is a presumption against arbitrariness in decision-making. We should try hard to find rational ways of resolving the conflict we are confronted with before giving up and opting for arbitrariness. As we’ll see below, there are plenty of better alternatives. My second objection to arbitrary resolution is that it is grounded on the belief that, if two equally ranked rights conflict, the specific violations of the two rights are equally bad. However, I believe that the violation of two rights of equal status might not be equally bad. Aside from the status of rights, there are indeed other factors that have an impact on the badness of a right violation. These factors are the significance of the specific right violation and the overall consequences of the violation of the right in question - I discuss both these issues, respectively in 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.

I will focus on these two more valuable remaining strategies to resolve the conflict: one strategy is based on a non-consequentialist appeal to the values underpinning the conflicting rights (2.2.2.), while the other strategy considers the balance of harms and benefits (2.2.3). The former of the two remaining strategies represents a non-teleological way of responding to values. 

2.2.2. A Qualitative Analysis is used to resolve the conflict

The choice of which right to privilege can also proceed on the basis of a non-consequentialist analysis of the specific rights involved (2.2.2). Such an analysis proceeds by applying guidelines to establish the value of upholding the rights in a particular instance. More specifically, the significance of a right claim hinges on the connection between the right claim and the value(s) it is supposed to protect.​[30]​ This qualitative analysis gives us a template for conflict resolution when two rights conflict. Two conditions must obtain to resolve the conflict: 

a)	There must be a meaningful connection between at least one of the specific right claims and the value (s) it is supposed to protect.

b)	The values connected to the conflicting rights must be different and have a different ranking in the theory of justice adopted. 

Condition (a) stipulates that at least one of the rights must have a meaningful connection with its underpinning value. If only one of the conflicting rights has a meaningful connection with its underpinning value, then this right should be given precedence. I assume that there is a meaningful connection when the value justifies the existence of the right in the first place and the right genuinely succeeds in protecting or expressing this justificatory value. As I briefly mentioned it earlier, the right to free speech is partly justified by three different arguments: an epistemic argument, a political argument and an intrinsic argument. At least one of the values involved in these different arguments (namely epistemic value, political value or individual integrity) should be protected by the specific right claim.

I will illustrate this point by pointing to a case in which the specific right claim is not protective of any of the justificatory values of freedom of expression. If we take the example of the man who shouts “fire” in a theatre, his shouting “fire” in a theatre has no epistemic value (there is no fire and he does not believe there is a fire), no political value and does not express the respect owed to each individual.​[31]​ The specific right claim in his shouting “fire” does not protect any of the justificatory value that underpins freedom of expression, it is thus not entitled to the protection of freedom of speech. If only one right is connected to its underpinning value, one does not need to consider how important this value is; it is enough to demonstrate that the other right is not so closely tied to its justificatory value. If both rights are so connected to their underpinning values, we then need to turn to condition (b). Condition (b) stipulates that the underpinning values must have a different rank for the comparison to give guidance. I will now describe briefly two similar procedures used by Waldron and Rawls. Waldron’s procedure invokes something similar to condition a), while Rawls’ procedure is somewhat closer to my condition b).

First, Jeremy Waldron suggests looking at what he labels ‘internal connections’. ‘Internal connections’ refer to the kind of link that exists between a right claim and its founding value. There is an ‘internal connection’, when the right claim is faithful to the core value that justified its existence. Waldron gives the example of a Nazi speech. If one does not look at the value underpinning freedom of expression, one would understand free speech as protecting any kind of speech without looking at the content of the speech in question. One would thus believe that freedom of expression protects the Nazi speech. However, if one looks at internal connections, as Waldron suggests, a Nazi speech contradicts in substance the value underpinning the right to free speech. It would deny free speech to Jewish individuals on the basis of their ethnicity. If freedom of speech is valued because it is crucial in upholding the respect owed to each individual (the intrinsic argument for freedom of speech), any speech that does not exemplify this value should not be protected by the right to free speech. 

Looking at ‘internal connections’ in this way amounts to shifting the discussion from rights to values. Rights are not treated as sacrosanct entities whose value is undisputed; they have normative weight only if they have an ‘internal connection’ with their founding value(s). 

Second, John Rawls’ Justice-As-Fairness shows the same concern for discerning substantial from non-substantial violations of rights. I will argue here that the combination of two distinct procedures in Rawls has roughly the same function as Waldron’s ‘internal connection’. These two distinct procedures are the regulation/restriction distinction and the relation of the specific right claim to the two moral powers. When Rawls applies the distinction between restriction and regulation to freedom of speech, he describes regulations as applying only to the formal characteristics of the speech act. He assumes that formal features of speech acts are the only features that would need to be regulated in order to respect other liberties. Restrictions, that is, legislations that are content-based would not be required to respect other liberties:

‘… rules of order are essential for regulating free discussion. Not everyone can speak at once, or use the same public facility at the same time for different purposes. ​[32]​ Instituting the basic liberties, just like realizing different interests, requires social organization and scheduling as to time and place, and so on. The requisite regulations should not be mistaken for restrictions on the content of speech, for example, prohibitions against publicly arguing for various religious and philosophical or moral and political doctrines, or against raising questions of general and particular fact about the justice of the basic structure and its social policies.’ (Rawls, 2001, pp.111-112)

However, Rawls also claims that some speech content does not deserve protection. He draws a distinction between basic liberties and other liberties. Basic liberties are those liberties that are necessary to the full development and exercise of the two moral powers (that is, the sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good).​[33]​ Rawls refers more particularly to two fundamental cases:

a)	The application of the principles of justice to the basic structure and its social policies thanks to the citizen’s capacity for a sense of justice

b)	The exercise of citizens’ powers of practical reason in their pursuit of their conception of the good. 

Rawls considers that freedom of speech is a basic liberty because it has an important role in the exercise of the two moral powers. However, he latter qualifies this claim by pointing to specific speech acts that have no role in the exercise of the two moral powers. These kinds of speech should not be specially protected and might even be considered as offences:
 
Libel and defamation of private persons (in contrast with political and other public figures) has no significance at all for the free use of public reason to judge and regulate the basic structure. In addition, those forms of speech are private wrongs. Incitements to imminent and lawless use of force, whatever the significance of the speaker’s overall political views, are too disruptive of democratic political procedures to be permitted by the rules of order of public discussion (Rawls, 2001, p.114).

According to Rawls, speech acts which are not justified by their role in the development of public reason are not granted the special protection given by the right to free speech. This implies that Rawls leaves room for a re-evaluation of the extent to which the right in question is connected to the reason for which freedom of expression is considered a basic liberty.

To sum up, Rawls’ distinction between regulation and restriction combined with the significance the specific right claim has for the use of public reason performs roughly the same function as Waldron’s concept of ‘internal connection’. Both Waldron and Rawls claim that specific right claims need to be interpreted in order to assess their relation to specific values. Waldron claims that these values are those that justify the right in the first place, while Rawls claims that these values are those that are fundamental for Justice-as-Fairness. Their approaches do not go all the way down to a case-by-case analysis, as they both use specific guiding principles to judge the importance of a specific right claim.  

However, objections can be raised against the idea that a right is valuable only when it is protective of its raison d’être (or the fundamental values of a specific theory of justice). To begin with, if freedom of expression, for instance, is not protected whenever expression stands in opposition to a liberal commitment, it might give too much leeway to ad hoc personal judgements on values and, by the same token, becomes void. If free speech were entrenched to prevent censorship of speech acts on the basis of difference in opinions, leaving the decision of which kind of speech should be protected by free speech to ad hoc judgments in this way would just wrap censorship in a garb of liberal freedoms. 

Moreover, some expectations are built after the entrenchment of a right that are not related to the value(s) that ground(s) the right in question (or any value fundamental to the specific theory of justice). Rights are useful partly because they are rules, that is, they give specific guidance for behaviour. They establish some certainty in the interactions between individuals, by attributing foreseeable rewards and punishment to the following or the breaking of the rule. This certainty is seen by Frederik Shauer as key to ground a more solid basis for rights as such, even when they stand in opposition with the justification that once grounded them: ‘Whether for reasons of expediency, or for that aspect of fairness that comes from certainty and predictability, we often choose some amount of “ruleness” instead of instance by instance determination. (…) The rule itself grants rights independent of those that may be “deserved” under the rule’s justification, and thus divorcing the rule from its justification in a given instance does not even in that instance extinguish all claims of rule-based right.’ (Shauer, 1987, p. 117) Although qualitative analyses are not instance by instance determination, they require interpretations that are also uncertain and unclear; the same objections can thus apply to them. Relying on rules is not only efficient, it is also fair. Individuals rely on the simplicity of rules to know what are the legal limits to their behaviour, so as to adapt their behaviour to the foreseeable rewards and punishments. 

Allowing for an interpretation of the rules in question would be unfair to individuals, as it would deprive them of clear guidelines. What would then be the purpose of having liberties, if one remains unclear of what they are? Who could enjoy any right, in the ignorance of when exactly this right would cease to be a right and be punishable by law? The enjoyment of rights requires specific public guidelines. 

Before concluding this section, I need to point to the fact that Rawls would have been led to reject the claim that freedom of expression and copyright conflict. I pointed to the fact that Rawls’s application of his distinction between restriction and regulation to freedom of speech led him to conclude that it corresponded to the distinction between form and content-based legislations of speech, which is common currency in the literature on freedom of expression. According to this distinction, although freedom of expression is usually taken to prevent any kind of regulation on the content of speech, it is usually considered perfectly legitimate to regulate speech with respect to its formal features (the time, volume and place of speech can be regulated).​[34]​ Freedom of expression is conceived then as protecting the content of speech but not its formal characteristics. Similarly, the idea/form distinction in copyright law allows for an expression of the content of a speech and forbids only the exact formal reproduction of the copyrighted work. Therefore, if Rawls believes that the regulations of the formal features of speech are no violation of freedom of speech, he must deny the possibility of conflict between freedom of expression and copyright. If freedom of expression protects the content of the speech but not its form and if copyright regulates only the reproduction of the form of a particular work and not the reproduction of its content, then the two rights do not even apply to the same aspect of the copyrighted work. This leads us back to the conclusion that there is no conflict between freedom of expression and copyright (1.3). In order to argue that freedom of expression and copyright conflict, one has to deny the relevance of the distinction between regulations of content and regulation of form in the liberal literature on freedom of expression. 

To sum up, there are two main advantages a definite list of rights provide.  First, the specification of a right into a rule prevents any contentious interpretation of principles. There is no danger of partiality on the part of the interpreter. Second, the codification of the abstract principle into the specific rule permits predictability and certainty in the rewards and punishment system attached to rights.​[35]​ These advantages are threatened by the adoption of a qualitative analysis of rights. These are great advantages of having some clear list of rights, but I believe that there is a remedy to this flaw in qualitative analysis. If some specific categories of speech were defined as falling out of the protective sphere of speech, then citizens would have enough guidance. These categories would identify different types of speech that would have standard interpretations. I believe that qualitative analysis is too important to be given up for the reason that it leaves too much uncertainty. As long as some standard interpretation are given for some categories of speech, the standards are clear enough. 

2.2.3. Consequentialism is used to resolve the conflict

The conflict between equally ranked rights can be resolved on the basis of the balance of harm and benefit (2.2.3). If both rights have a strong connection to an equally ranked value, the balance of harm and benefit could be crucial in helping us determine which right should be given priority. Moreover, even in cases of rights of unequal status, consequentialist considerations might tilt the balance towards the weaker right (2.1.2). 

There are three versions of this consequentialist method for decision-making. The first version interprets interests as referring only to material interests. The second version of the consequentialist approach considers only valuable goods that constitute non-material interests. A third version would consider both material and non-material interests. In this chapter, I will focus on the second version, for simplicity’s sake, but I believe the most plausible consequentialist version would include both material and non-material interests. What are the non-material interests that would be promoted by giving priority to freedom of expression over copyright? Three valuable goods could be invoked in case of conflict: political participation, cultural belonging or individual social identity, and education. I’ll consider each of these goods in turn. 

1. Widespread access to cultural and intellectual works is instrumental in enabling the engagement of citizens with the political realm. 

There are two possible ways of setting out this argument. On the one hand, the argument could posit a direct link between knowledge of cultural and intellectual works and political involvement. Most political decisions reflect a set of values. Important political issues permeate the national psyche and inform the cultural production of a nation. Many cultural and intellectual works are thus involved in the expression of values that are relevant to political debates. In this way, these works are relevant to the political debate as such. On the other hand, the argument could posit an indirect link between knowledge of cultural and intellectual works and political involvement. It would postulate that cultural knowledge is crucial for the cultivation of a sense of cultural belonging that is itself needed to give unity to a political community and to get citizens politically involved.​[36]​

2. Widespread access to cultural and intellectual copyrighted works is instrumental in shaping and affirming an individual’s social identity. 

Cultural and intellectual works constitute the cultural framework of a nation, which provides a background within which, or against which, the individual can position herself. This explains why the individual needs this framework, or set of references, in order to shape her own identity.​[37]​ From a liberal perspective, having access to a wide set of cultural and intellectual works is a prerequisite for an individual to truly choose her social identity. The individual remains free to rejects her community’s beliefs and values but her rejection has still to be understood in the wider framework of her community’s values. Moreover, the individual needs a set of cultural references not only for the sake of self-definition but in order to express her identity. Expression of one’s identity often proceeds by reference to certain cultural and intellectual works. Our favourite writer, sculptor, painter or director is partly revealing of our personality and we use these clues to express it to others. Access of copyrighted works is thus instrumental in both defining and expressing one’s social identity.  

3. Widespread access to cultural and intellectual copyrighted works is instrumental for the general education of individuals. 

From a neutralist liberal perspective, education is valuable because it is a political good -- it helps shape individual autonomy (and it could also be argued to help in the training of responsible citizenship). Let us take again as an example our imaginary character, Ulysses. Ulysses is talking about poetry with twenty friends every Tuesday. When it is his turn to bring some texts, he brings twenty photocopied sets of poems by Plath and distributes them. This constitutes a breach of copyright law, but would not constitute such a breach, had Ulysses been a teacher in a recognised institution.​[38]​ Education is indeed recognised as a legitimate case for special allowance in copyright policies, but only when it pertains to institutional education. 

These three sketches of consequentialist considerations have shown that widespread access to copyrighted work has instrumental value for individuals and society as a whole. But they do not establish as such that these works should be freely available and that copyright should disappear; they only constitute a prima facie basis for wanting copyrighted works to be accessible by the greatest number of people. Moreover, I do not believe that these sketches of arguments could ever ground an argument for the abolition of copyright.  I claim that there are four considerable objections to such a move.  

First, they could not constitute arguments against copyright per se as they would target not only the intellectual property cost but all the other costs incurred by the creation, production and distribution of copyrighted material. The copyright is after all only a small proportion of the total cost of a product. 

Second, there is the question of the choice of goods to be provided freely. In conditions of scarcity, some other goods, such as health, ought to have priority over those of political involvement, education and cultural belonging. Moreover, financing the free access of copyrighted work does not guarantee the promotion of the goods mentioned above, as individuals might choose not to engage with them. To a certain extent, the same could be said about health, that is, financing the best health care system do not ensure that individuals would actually go to the doctor. However, it can still be said that the connection between the financing of copyright and citizens’ political engagement, education and sense of cultural belonging is much more tenuous than in the case of health. 

Third, financial rewards work as incentives. Without providing creators with enough incentives, there could be a drastic reduction in the total amount of cultural and intellectual work available to a society as a whole.​[39]​  There is a certain threshold point beyond which reducing copyright rewards would decrease the total amount of intellectual and cultural work available for the society to access. If the total of intellectual and cultural works produced is less than it could have been with the appropriate financial rewards, each individual would have access to fewer copyrighted works. If that is the case, the consequentialist case for widening the access to copyrighted work would thus be undermined in its own terms. 

Fourth, the question of the fairness of copyright is to be examined from two very different perspectives; the perspective of the consumer and the perspective of the creator. From the creator’s perspective, the question to be asked is whether copyrighted work constitutes a just system of remuneration, that is, whether the criteria of remuneration attached to intellectual and artistic works are fair. There is a strong intuition in support of the claim that a creator should have some economic reward for her work. If copyright is outweighed by freedom of expression and the state does not cover up and reward the creator, this would be unjust. 

I believe that although there might be plausible replies to the first and fourth objections, the second and third objection are quite decisive in the support of some form of copyright. I do not believe that the current form copyright takes, as rewarding creators proportionately to their popularity, is fair. This actually is the basis of my reply to the fourth objection.  

Why do I reject the claim that copyright is a fair way of rewarding creators? I believe that popularity might not be a fair way of rewarding creators, because I believe that different kinds of goods created might require different principles of distribution and remuneration. Most theories of justice recognise that different goods need different principles of distribution (see Walzer, 1985). It is also implicitly and explicitly recognised that different produced goods might also need different principles of remuneration, as the value of the goods might be judged by different criteria. If one believes in the intrinsic value of art, the right retribution for the creator should not be only dependent on the number of people who share one’s taste. Intellectual/artistic creations can be judged according to two standards. One is the extent to which it is appreciated or found insightful by its contemporaries (social utility), the other is the extent to which the creation in question fits other non-subjective criteria. One would have to refer to the originality, complexity, aesthetic value of the work in question along with its ability to encourage reflection or express human feelings and concerns. In the case of intellectual creations, one could judge the work on the basis of its truth-value and its explanatory potential. I am not yet recommending the judgement by an elite as a general remunerative principle. It is not in the scope of this chapter to discuss the problems involved in leaving some individuals decide what reward shall be attributed to each work. However, if the state rewards the creator a fixed sum that might not be a reflection of how popular her work is, I would not find it unfair.  

If successful, the above arguments either undermine the general system of property rights or, more weakly, result in the demand that the state finance free access to cultural and intellectual works. On the latter, weak reading, copyright and the general property right system is left untouched (Davies, 2002, p. 249). The property rights system is indeed preserved by the shift of the cost burden from the customer to the state. ​[40]​ But, given that copyright as such is not affected on this weak reading, I will move on to examine the strong reading.  On the strong reading, the three arguments are taken to attack broadly all forms of property rights and would thus demand the abolition of all property rights. On this strong reading, copyright as such is not at stake either, since it is not distinguished from other property rights.​[41]​ 

It is therefore important to see if we can find a basis for distinguishing intellectual property rights from other property rights in such a way that these arguments would be applicable only to copyright. Such a distinction can be provided without entailing a discrimination against intellectual works, on the basis of some specific features that the goods protected by intellectual property rights display.​[42]​ This will be done by focusing on the fairness of the remunerative system of intellectual property rights. 

In order to respect all kinds of work equally, what is needed is the recognition of some rewards and rights attached to manual and intellectual work. However, distinctions in the provision of these rewards can be made on the basis of the nature and availability of the good produced. Both the nature and availability of the good should have an impact on the regulations of use and on the retribution appropriate for the work in question. Because land is scarce and geographically located, the number of individuals using the same piece of land is detrimental to the enjoyment and possible use by each individual. In contrast, the number of individuals accessing the reproduction of a copyrighted work is not detrimental to the possible use and enjoyment by each individual. The enjoyment by an individual A of the reproduction of a certain painting x is possible while an individual B is enjoying another reproduction of the same x. Not only can A and B enjoy the reproduction of the same x simultaneously, but the enjoyment and use by A of the reproduction of x is not impeded in any way by the enjoyment by B of the reproduction of x. This is a first major difference in the usage modalities of copyrighted work that can justify a difference in the regulation of intellectual property rights (in both its distributive and retributive principles). These specificities in the enjoyment and value of intellectual and artistic work might legitimately ground a differential treatment for copyrighted work. If this differential treatment is fully argued for, then the arguments mentioned above could be used only against copyright and not against other property rights. 

With respect to the third objection, I am not convinced by the assumption that in the fields of cultural/artistic and intellectual work, economic rewards are such a driving force. There are all sorts of possible rewards, such as social and professional recognition that might motivate individuals. 





In this chapter, I have set out a taxonomy of different possible relations between copyright and freedom of expression. I argued that there are certain forms of possible conflict between freedom of expression and copyright that have been previously overlooked. I also argued, however that it is unlikely that such a conflict would occur, as the three conditions set out in this chapter would all need to be satisfied.  I pointed nevertheless to cases in which the arguments provided would apply in a more plausible way: these are borderline cases in which the individual would use copyrighted material just in excess of what is allowed by fair use. 

I admitted that the reproduction of copyrighted work could be required for freedom of expression because of the function creators have in society and the importance copyrighted work has for citizens in a specific cultural space. Creators are uniquely able to express feelings, ideas and opinions. Their works might become part of a cultural space and become imbued with connotation and references that are difficult to convey otherwise. I granted that this would open the possibility for copyright to conflict with freedom of expression in a more widespread way than so far considered. 

However, I also claimed that the conflict between copyright and freedom of expression would occur only if three conditions were satisfied. I have further claimed that these conditions were unlikely to occur in a single instance, apart from the borderline cases singled out. I granted that the reproduction of copyrighted work could be necessary for freedom of expression, but I dismissed the idea that the allowances made by copyright law would not be sufficient for that purpose. Most of the arguments in favour of the necessity of reproducing exactly the copyrighted work beyond what was allowed by copyright law were relying on a concept of expression not suitable for the political right of freedom of expression. I believe that individuals are free to express themselves, to the extent that they are aware of what it is they have to express and that they are to a minimum extent the originators of this expression. As a political right, freedom of speech does not require the subtlety and nuances that I claimed it could have in section 1.2. 

Nevertheless, if in some specific cases copyright conflicts with freedom of expression, a liberal theory of justice could legitimately consider both rights to have either equal or unequal status. If a liberal theory of justice takes both rights to have an equal status, this would preclude the use of a principled method to resolve the conflict. I described a qualitative procedure for normative assessment as providing a defensible decision-making process in case of conflict of rights. This procedure is similar to qualitative methods discussed by Waldron and Rawls. I suggested to remedy to the problems of uncertainty that afflicts this procedure by setting up categories of speech, that would provide guidance to citizens. I further argued that we should let consequentialist considerations decide the matter only if this kind of qualitative method fails to produce a definite answer. 

Finally, I examined possible arguments in favour of granting free access to all copyrighted work.  I then gestured towards the possibility that these arguments could be used in a way that would specifically target copyright, once a plausible distinction is made between intellectual and other property rights. Such a distinction would be grounded in the intangible quality of intellectual property, which makes it possible for several individuals to make use of it at the same time. 

One might doubt the importance of the question whether or not freedom of expression conflicts with copyright when it seems that it hinges so much on terminology. Freedom of expression can be defined in a way that pre-empts conflict with copyright and this seems to lead to the conclusion that there is no substantive difference between the claim that the two rights do not conflict and the claim that they do. In one case the rights are defined in such a way as not to permit any such conflict. In the other case, rights are defined more widely so that the possibility of conflict is allowed, requiring the subsequent employment of some resolution procedure. 

I concede that there is a terminological dimension to the debate about the definition of freedom of expression. However, I believe that this terminological dimension matters. The definition of a right can either conform to normative intuitions about core interests of individuals or it can fail to conform to them. Moreover, it is crucial to adopt appropriate definitions of rights, because once a right has been defined, it grounds a strong claim. A violation of right grounds duties of compensation (provided the party that violated the right is able to compensate the other party). In the case of conflict of rights, one right will be infringed.​[43]​ This infringement might ground not only a duty of compensation but also a ‘moral remainder’. An individual has had her right infringed and the individual is still harmed by this infringement even if it is legitimate,. If we rule out the conflict of rights as a matter of definition, then there is no space for (perceived) violation of right and no (perceived) moral remainder. 
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1. The specific rights of free speech and copyright don’t (or can’t) conflict 

2. The specific rights of free speech and copyright can and do  conflict 

2.2 The right to Free Speech and copyright have the same status 

1.1 Freedom of expression does not require the infringement of copyright

2.1 The right to Free Speech and copyright do not have the same status 

1.3 The conflict is only prima facie: once copyright is appropriately defined, there is no conflict

2.1.1 One of the rights trumps the other and must thus be privileged

2.1.2 One of the rights trumps the other but a decisive balance of harm and benefits on the side of the weaker right make it win. 

2.2.1 No rational resolution of the conflict is possible. Arbitrary decision. 

2.2.2 The conflict is resolved by a qualitative analysis: looking at the relation between rights and their underpinning values.    

2.2.3 Consequentialism: the conflict in question is resolved by considering the overall balance of benefit and harm. 

Conflict of rights is generally possible

Conflict of rights is impossible










^1	   The free expression of artists can be guaranteed by the moral right to be attributed the authorship of a piece of work, but does not require the economic right attached to it. 
^2	  I believe two sets of normative issues are related to that control. First, the ownership of copyright rights by corporations might lack legitimacy. This is so, because the two main justifications for copyright are based on the special relationship between the work and its author/creator. Second, there might be a limitation of autonomy entailed by the control exerted by corporations, in its selective power of determining what others would watch and listen to. The autonomy of citizens would be reduced, to the extent that they would suffer from a reduction in the cultural options available to them. At least, this would be the case in Raz’s conception of autonomy.
^3	  This issue is highly sensitive to the theory of justice endorsed. 
^4	  The work is considered original, if sufficient time, effort, technical skills and knowledge have been used (Cornish, 2006, p. 12).
^5	  According to a choice-based theory of rights, ‘the essential feature of a duty which yields a right is that the person to whom the duty is owed is able to control the performance of that duty.’ (Jones, 1994, p. 32).
^6	  Hillel Steiner claims that the compossibility of rights ( compatibility of rights with each other) is necessary for that set of rights to be possible (Steiner,  1994, p. 2). 
^7	  On this view, an individual x has a right ‘ if and only if x can have rights, and other things being equal, an aspect of x’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty’ (Raz, 1986, p.166). 
^8	  This distinction can also be referred to as the distinction between idea and expression (see Hart, Fazzani & Clark, 2006, p. 161).
^9	  The question of what qualify as speech is similarly difficult to answer without violating content-neutrality. However, it is crucial since what fails to qualify as speech would lose the special protection accorded by freedom of expression to the act. The liberal attitude consists typically in using a low standard for qualifying as a speech act while considering certain kinds of harm as possibly outweighing the right to free speech. 
^10	  Note that it is indifferent whether Ulysses charges his audience or not. 
^11	  But what criterion qualifies the street as a public place? The relevant criterion to distinguish between public and private here is the relationship between the performer and his/her audience. The character of the audience is a criterion more important than the size (Phillips and Firth 2000, p. 188).
^12	  Copyright protects any materially recorded work against the reproduction in any material form. The work can be recorded as any mode of visual or accoustic presentation and the infringement of a work’s copyright could consist in a visual or accoustic performance of it (See Phillips and Firth 2000, p.176).
^13	  This second argument is weaker if one takes into account the limited length of copyright (70 years). However, some artistic works might gain symbolic weight in a short span of time. The argument, if made weaker, is not entirely defeated by considering the time limitation of copyright. 
^14	   Wittgenstein could be an example of this (Kahane, Kanterian and Kuusela (ed), 2007). 
^15	   The owner of copyright can’t object to minor borrowings of his/her work (see Cornish & Llewelyn, 2003, pp. 440 and following).
^16	   Economic rights can also be justified morally as the rightful desert of someone’s work. By moral rights attached to copyrighted work, I refer here to some more fundamental moral rights. 
^17	   Moreover, in the United Kingdom, two further moral rights are added: The right against fake attribution of a work and the right to privacy in private photographs and films (Cornish & Llewelyn, 2003, p. 455). 
^18	   They clearly belong to intellectual property rights, but some have claimed that these moral rights do not belong to copyright law strictly speaking (see Cornish & Llewelyn, 2003, p. 466). I will assume here that these moral rights belong entirely to copyright law, because the circumstances in which these moral rights are most likely to be threatened are cases of reproduction of copyrighted work.
^19	   I believe that another possible conception of copyright would also not conflict with freedom of expression. In this conception, some economic rights are not attached to the reproduction as such of the cultural product but only to its production. This conception is not market-based.
^20	   The libertarian strategy is thus to define freedoms, such as freedom of expression in such a way as to pre-empt conflict between rights. One objection could be that this strategy pre-empts conflict only in a terminological sense, but amounts to giving more weight to property rights, as they are considered fundamental. 
^21	   For another example of non-libertarian liberal using that conception (see Dworkin, 1977, p. 269).
^22	   It has been argued somewhat similarly that the distinction between regulation and restriction is inappropriate because it grounds an absolutist division between basic liberties and all other consequentialist reasons for putting limits to the upholding of a right (Farrelly, 2007, p. 854). 
^23	   The promotion of freedom is not necessarily maximised by the protection of libertarian rights. Taxes might limit the freedom of the individual being taxed, but they increase the freedom of those who benefit from it via social policies funded by them (see Cohen, 2001, p.55). 
^24	   The two claims are the following: First, the reproduction of intellectual/cultural work is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of freedom of expression. Second, the allowances made by copyright law are not sufficient for the protection of freedom of expression. 
^25	   I will assume for now that rights are generally protective of values, despite the fact that in some cases, the punctilious enforcement of a right might endanger the value it is supposed to protect. 
^26	   The distinction between classical and modern liberalism is useful to bear in mind in our examination of the conflict between copyright and freedom of expression: while classical liberalism gives more weight to property right, modern liberalism is more likely to favour freedom of expression (see Ryan, 1993). 
^27	   I mention later the possibility that the weaker right outweighs the stronger right, this could be the case only if the balance of harm and benefit favour overwhelmingly the weaker right. 
^28	  It has to be noted that the decision should also take into account the difference in the ranking of the two rights. 
^29	   ‘Now it is essential to observe that the basic liberties are given by a list of such liberties. Important among these are political liberty (the right to vote and to hold public office) and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person) ; the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law.’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 53). 
^30	   Although I do not address that issue here, I am aware that this qualitative approach might also be legitimately applied to conflicting rights of unequal status. 
^31	   In this case, other considerations are also at stake. The shouting of “fire” might trigger a wave of panic and the audience would attempt an escape. In this process, several lives might be lost. These consequentialist considerations encourage us to wonder if the shouting of “fire” is entitled to the protection of freedom of speech.
^32	   A similar remark is made by Hart: ‘We have rules of order in debate so that the exchange of arguments and the pursuit of truth can be facilitated. We have these rules not so that debaters can exercise the maximum freedom to speak (...) but in order better to achieve the purposes of debate’ (Hart quoted in Gray, 2000, p. 70-71). 
^33	   ‘The proposed criterion is this: the basic liberties and their priority are to guarantee equally for all citizens the social conditions essential for the adequate development and the full and informed exercise of their two moral powers in what we have referred to as the two fundamental cases. These two cases we now specify more fully. 	The first fundamental case is connected with the capacity for a sense of justice and concerns the application of the principles of justice to the basic structure and its social policies. The equal political liberties and freedom of thought are to ensure the opportunity for the free and informed application of the principles of justice to that structure and to its policies by means of the full and effective exercise of citizens’ sense of justice. All this is necessary to make possible the free use of public reason.	The second fundamental case is connected with the capacity for a (complete) conception of the good (normally associated with a comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine), and concerns the exercise of citizens’ powers of practical reason in forming, revising, and rationally pursuing such a conception over a complete life. Liberty of conscience and freedom of association are to ensure the opportunity for the free and informed exercise of this capacity and its companion powers of practical reason and judgment (Rawls, 2001, p. 113).
^34	  It has to be noted that, in the case of fighting words or incitements to hatred, liberals can justify content-regulations (See Cohen, 1993, p. 213-214).
^35	   ‘Particularity, in a non-ideal world, provides, among other things, certainty, predictability, uniformity, mental manageability, and insurance against misunderstanding and misapplication of general principles. If we did not believe these values to be important, we would have no need to particularize abstract foundational rights, but could instead apply the abstraction directly to cases without the mediating force of particularized rights’ (Shauer, 1987, p.118). 
^36	   Note that communal identity could not be valued intrinsically, as it would be only plausible within a communitarian theory of justice and would not constitute an individual interest or a political value. It would thus be an odd value to aim at maximising from a consequentialist perspective. Kukathas, 2003, p. 176.
^37	   Charles Taylor evokes this phenomenon in The Ethics of Authenticity:  ‘The general feature of human life that I want to evoke is its fundamentally dialogical character. We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining an identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression. For purposes of this discussion, I want to take “language” in a broad sense, covering not only the words we speak but also other modes of expression whereby we define ourselves, including the “languages” of art, of gesture, of love, and the like. (…)We define this [our identity] always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against the identities our significant others want to recognize in us.’  (1991, p. 33). 
^38	   One way of making sense of the liberal distinction between institutional and non-institutional education would be to go back to the liberal justification for education. Education is valuable instrumentally for liberals because it can be said to ground individuals’ autonomy (alternatively helping individuals become responsible citizens). However, there is no proportional correlation between the level of education of an individual and the level of autonomy (or responsibility) that this individual exhibits as a citizen. Only a threshold level of education could possibly be said to be necessary for citizens to be autonomous (or responsible). The necessity of a threshold level of education could thus constitute a justification for the specific allowances made for institutional education. If only a threshold level of education is needed to ground an individual’s autonomy and/or to help her become a responsible citizen, then institutional education could be said to provide just this threshold level of education. However, one could have some suspicions against the idea that institutional education matches exactly the requirements of a threshold level of education.
^39	   I would like to thank here Axel Gosseries for reminding me of this point about incentives. 
^40	   There are problems with this reading that I do not have space to discuss here. Establishing private patronage or state support for creators is a risky strategy, as there is a possibility of state control and state censorship of the arts (Davies, 2002, p. 257). 
^41	  Waiving the copyright fee would not be enough to provide a free access to copyrighted work. There are other costs than need to be paid for, if cultural and intellectual works are to be freely accessed: there are the costs of production, the institutional setting for accessing it, etc. These costs are not related to the intellectual/artistic work involved in the creation of copyrighted work. They are related to the manual work and resources involved in the production and distribution of copyrighted work. Again, the strong reading is not addressing copyright as such, since it fails to differentiate copyright from other property rights. 
^42	   But first, I will explain briefly why the distinction is problematic. Intellectual property rights should not be starkly distinguished from other property rights. If we were to treat intellectual property rights as a less stringent form of property rights, one would de facto attribute less consideration to intellectual or artistic work than to manual work. I will put into question here the claim that, in order to treat copyright as having the same status than other property rights, no distinction can be made between the two.
^43	   Thompson made a distinction between infringing and violating a right. According to her, infringing a right is the legitimate curtailment of a right, while violating a right is the illegitimate curtailment of a right (see Thompson, 1986, p. 51). 
^44	  I would like to thank Axel Gosseries Ramalho, Guy Kahane, Mark Philp and Alan Strowel for their extremely valuable comments on  previous versions of this chapter. 
